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Abstract: Developments in the field of gender theory as applied to education since 
the 1970s are briefly reviewed in order to highlight key challenges and debates 
around gender categorisation and identification in gender and education. We 
argue that conundrums of categorisation have haunted, and continue to haunt, 
the field of gender theory, and empirical applications (such as the case of 
education) in particular. We explain how we have attempted to address some of 
the conundrums arising in our own theoretical work, and analyse remaining 
challenges that we feel the field of education needs to address in order to advance 
theoretically. Identifying two key tensions underpinning this empirical dilemma 
of gender categorisation – the tension between agency and determinism in gender 
identification, and that between gender deconstruction and gender analysis – we 
seek to weave a path through some of these complex debates, and to indicate 
ways in which they may be addressed in future work. We argue that in order to 
avoid essentialism and reification of gender distinction, we need to apply a ‘three-
fold’ analysis that incorporates three different elements in our categorisation of 
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To take stock of theoretical developments in gender and education is to traverse a host 
of issues: not only the evolution of gender theory as applied to education, educational 
institutions and their participants; but also conceptions of childhood, youth, the 
professions, educational contexts, different social identities and their inter-relation, and 
so on. Nevertheless, these are the complexities this article seeks to chart, in its response 
to the call to appraise theoretical developments in the field of gender and education 
studies. In what follows, our focus is on gender theory as it has developed in Anglophone 
nations since the 1970s, when research in gender and education first began to form a 
critical mass (Skelton & Francis, 2007). Specifically, we are going to discuss gender 
theory as it has been applied to children and young people.  
 
The development of gender theory as applied in education 
 
The analysis of gender and gender inequality, precipitated by feminist concerns about 
social inequalities on the basis of designation as ‘male’ or ‘female’, has always been 
troubled by categorisation. Second wave feminists initially referred to sex differences 
(categorising subjects as male or female in application of a dominant, dualistic lens). 
However, the problematic of this categorisation, with its underpinning assumptions that 
all subjects have bodies identifiable as either male or female, and that ‘natural’ 
differences in behaviour emanate from these bodies, was quickly identified (see e.g. 
Kessler & McKenna, 1978). This approach was therefore supplanted by the creation and 
application of the concept of gender (Stoller, 1968; Oakley, 1970). This theoretical 
construct appeared to escape the essentialism of ‘sex’, capturing the way in which 
different patterns of behaviour (and indeed bodies) are socially constructed, rather than 
innate. This distinction was both radical and influential: the concept of gender 
challenged the idea that body was destiny, and hence was of central import to feminist 
thinking. It also made a vital contribution for trans people, as it provided a way of 
describing their existence, in some ways making their lives legible (Paechter, 2003a).  
 
However, as we have variously outlined elsewhere in greater detail, problems with the 
concept of gender have subsequently emerged, due to dualistic premises which reflect 
an integral, if hidden, attachment to the concept of sex (Francis, 2002; 2008; Paechter, 
2003). These include an increasing tendency for ‘gender’ to be used as a straightforward 
substitute for ‘sex’ in everyday speech, with the result that the initial benefits of the 
distinction have gradually been eroded. 
 
Meanwhile, theoretical explanations for the transmission and perpetuation of gender 
differences and inequalities were becoming more sophisticated. The concept of 
patriarchy was undermined by two different bodies of work: one that highlighted how 
women could also oppress one another (and even oppress men) on the basis of factors 
such as ‘race’, class, sexuality, age and so on (hooks, 1982; Hill-Collins, 1991); and the 
other that challenged concepts of power as a possession of some groups at the expense 
of others, and instead showed power to be dispersed. Indeed, the work of Foucault 
(1977, 1978, 1980), which had a profound impact on gender theory in the late 1980s, 
critiqued assumptions that power is a possession , as well as highlighting the necessary 
accompaniment of resistance. Social reproduction theory, which in the 1970s facilitated 
many key analyses of the role of education institutions and classroom practices in the 
reproduction of gender inequalities, began also to be critiqued for its inability to explain 
resistance, or to account for the nuanced diversity of gender productions (Anyon, 1983; 
Riddell, 1989). These various developments generated increased attention to fluidity 
and contradictions in gender construction, the intersection of gender identities with 
those of ‘race’, social class and others, and interest in the complexities of contested 
power relations within, as well as between groups. Despite this, as we discuss later in 
the paper, even such intersectional analyses acknowledging diversity on different 
structural axes have largely been applied to groups in the global metropolitan North, 
ignoring the often different needs of people in less economically-privileged national 
contexts. 
 
In terms of conceptions of gender, and our theme of categorisation, it was within this 
context that the applications ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ (dualistic expressions of gender) 
began to be seen as limited, and inadequate to capture the diversity manifesting within 
these categories. To reflect this, the categories began to be employed in plural, as 
‘masculinities’ and ‘femininities’. RW Connell’s work made a significant intervention 
here, analysing how a hierarchy of masculinities can operate in different contexts 
(1995). Connell also showed how, albeit all men/boys benefit from patriarchy, 
dominant ‘hegemonic’ masculinities may subjugate others.  
 
However, these more plural analyses by no means escape the dualism at the heart of the 
concept ‘gender’. Indeed, these theories of ‘multiple masculinities and femininities’ have 
been accused of further reifying dualistic gender distinctions, and revealing the 
continuing (essentialist) tie back to the sexed body underpinning these apparently 
socially constructed gender productions. This can be seen in the ways in which all 
behaviours expressed by boys/men are categorised as reflecting a kind of masculinity 
(whether hegemonic or otherwise), and all those produced by girls are read as 
expressing varieties of femininity. Indeed, the ‘multiple masculinities and femininities’ 
approach has frequently manifested in typologies of masculinity and femininity, in 
gender and education research and elsewhere, a trend which Connell has lamented 
(Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). This approach, in which all expressions by men/boys 
are seen as forms of masculinity, is especially notable in Connell’s concept of 
‘subordinate masculinities’ (Connell, 1995). However apparently ‘feminine’ their 
behaviour, boys not part of locally hegemonic groups are still analysed as performing a 
type of (subordinate) masculinity, rather than performing femininity. As McInnes 
(1998) and Hood-William (1998) have identified, if behaviours produced by men/boys 
can only be read as masculine (and likewise for women/girls with regard to femininity), 
the categoriser is actually the body (sex), rather than gender. This application of sex as 
the invisible categoriser of masculinities and femininities illustrates what Hawkesworth 
(1997) has critiqued as the ‘base/superstructure’ model, where ‘gender’ is seen to flow 
directly from the sexed body: a position that can be seen as reverting to essentialism (as 
McInnes [1998] observes, in this case we might as well just apply ‘sex’. See also 
Paechter, 2003). Yet this problematic conflation of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ underpins much 
empirical work adopting ‘gender’ as a concept (Hawkesworth, 1997; Francis, 2002, 
2008).  
 
Indeed, this invocation of the body (‘sex’) as the ghostly categoriser of gender has, for 
the most part, continued to be reflected in empirical analyses of gender and education 
(even that maintaining poststructuralist and other post-humanist influences). As one of 
us has argued elsewhere, this arguably has dangerous consequences: because female 
non-gender-traditional expression is not read as ‘doing masculinity’, or male non-
traditional constructions as ‘doing femininity’, it tends to be gender-traditional 
behaviour that is identified and analysed by researchers of gender (Francis, 2002; 
2008). This risks over-representation and reification of gender difference, and hence 
exacerbation of the gender dichotomy rather than contribution to its deconstruction.  
 
Nevertheless, this conflation of sex/gender has been challenged in some quarters. 
Poststructuralist theorists returned to the deconstruction of the sex dualism initiated by 
early pioneers such as Garfinkel (1969) and Kessler & Mckenna (1978). Judith Butler 
(1990) applied her poststructuralist lens in showing how both sex and gender are 
socially constructed: brought into being via binary gender discourses that inscribe 
bodies according to a (mythical) duality. This position therefore also ‘queers’ the 
heterosexist assumptions underpinning dualistic notions of the sex/gender binary. This 
understanding of sex as socially constructed to the same extent as is gender echoes the 
earlier and more body-focused work of Fausto-Sterling (1987, 1989,1993), who 
examined the discourses of biology and embryology to establish that these contain 
particularly gendered constructions of how human bodies develop and function. These 
constructions have embedded within them earlier dualisms in which female bodies, and 
how they develop, are understood as passive; male bodies and their developmental 
pathways as active. Butler’s understanding of sex/gender as performative refuses 
essentialist ties to a sexed body. Hugely influential, this work was nevertheless 
primarily theoretical rather than empirical. Consequently, while generating numerous 
fruitful studies of the performance of gender (including in the education context), this 
did little to disrupt the continuing analysis of diverse performances of gender as 
reflecting either femininities for girls/women, or masculinities for boys/men. It was for 
this reason that the contribution of Jack Halberstam (1998) was stimulating. 
Halberstam drew on Butler’s theoretical work to analyse production of masculinity as 
cut loose from men, in relation to the case of Drag Kings. This analysis of female 
masculinity prises apart the ‘base/superstructure’ connection between sex and gender, 
and challenges perceptions of gender as characterising the domains of exclusively sexed 
physical bodies (Francis, 2008b).  
 
However, the identification of gender via performance, rather than bodies, is not 
without its problems (Francis, 2008b, 2010; Paechter, 2006). For as Becky has 
observed, this means analyzing expressions of gender, categorized according to 
rudimentary and highly stereotypical binaries (wherein attributes such as care, 
emotion, diligence, passivity etc are constructed as denoting femininity; and those such 
as strength, reason, confidence, action etc are seen to denote masculinity) (Francis, 
2008). Indeed, this danger is clear in Halberstam’s analysis of female masculinity: Carrie 
has characterized Halberstam’s valorisation of masculinity as reflecting a sort of Boys’ 
Own 1950s stereotype of middle-class masculinity (Paechter, 2006).  
 
Moreover, in addition to the issue of categorization/ascription, the production of gender 
as a matter of choice has also been critiqued for a potential lack of acknowledgement of 
the role of the spectator – and of society more broadly – in gender intelligibility; and 
(relatedly) for a lack of acknowledgement of the way in which power is unequally 
distributed according to the ascription of Self or Other. 
 
Hence, gender theory has clearly evolved in the period since gender and education 
began to emerge as a field in the 1970s, addressing a range of conceptual disputes, often 
illuminated by challenges in empirical application. Nevertheless, issues of 
categorization, and related theoretical dilemmas of agency/determinism, and accounts 
of power, persist. Analyses of contexts, performances, and inequalities in the field of 
gender and education have continued to draw on a range of wider theory: while some 
researchers have maintained an interest in poststructuralism as expressed in the 
accounts of Foucault, Butler and others, others have returned to structuralism 
(especially the work of Bourdieu), or explored the potential of psycho-social 
perspectives. Others still have found fruitful the broader post-humanist work 
exemplified by Deleuze, Guattari and contemporaries for better attending the 
multifaceted material and cultural assemblages that establish gender and other aspects 
of identity (and their affects) in complex and unpredictable ways. Nevertheless, many of 
these approaches are applied to address issues other than the classification and 
construction of genderi, and it is arguable that despite this rich array of theory, the field 
remains haunted by the underlying issue of categorization. 
 
This haunting is further complicated by our awareness  that many of the issues we are 
discussing are very much those of more privileged areas of the globe, in which many 
basic problems, such as equal access to education between boys and girls, have been 
overcome. We recognise that some of the theoretical questions we discuss pale into 
insignificance when we consider, for example, the gender-based violence pervading 
some schooling systems in places distant from the metropolitan global North (Bhana, 
2005a, b). We also need to appreciate that not only are there good reasons to maintain 
gender distinctions based on sexed bodies, where these relate to access to important 
goods such as education and healthcare, but that many non-Western cultures recognise 
a greater range of gender expressions and identities than is the case in the regions that 
dominate these debates (Imperato-McGinley, 1979; Nanda, 1999). 
 
 
Our own attempts to address these challenges 
 
For both of us this previous body of work on gender theory has led to a series of 
questions and dilemmas concerning the relationships between bodies, gender 
attribution, gender identity claims and the nature of masculinity and femininity. For 
both of us, much of our work over the last ten years or so stems from an attempt to 
refine some of the theoretical concepts and propose ways through the maze, while 
maintaining a focus on how these play out with specific reference to children and 
schools. While we have approached these issues in different ways and to some extent 
with different conclusions, we share an unease with three elements of much 
contemporary gender theory, which relate to issues of gender categorization and 
power. First, we are concerned about the lack of transparent analysis of the ways 
gender attributions are constructed and applied in research and practice. In particular, 
we have both been concerned to explore what it means to make a claim, and for that 
claim to be legitimised, to a particular gender. Secondly, we are uneasy with the 
persistent reification of particular productions of masculinity and femininity, especially 
those associated with dominant males. These two issues are often closely inter-related. 
Thirdly, mainstream gender theory tends to be only partially rooted in embodiment, 
and, where embodiment is theorized and discussed, the focus has tended to be 
exclusively on adult bodies. There is work that pays careful attention to children’s 
bodies - mainly but not exclusively carried out by researchers in gender and educationii. 
However, this has been overlooked by the most influential writers on gender theory, 
who have, with the exception of Connell, had little to say about education (Connell, 
2010). While our attention in this article is largely to the first two points, we return to 
the issue of gender embodiment in children towards the end of the article. 
 
Reflecting on the first issue, of gender identification and attribution. Halberstam’s 
(1998) attention to gender attribution, and what it means to be recognised as a 
particular gender, reflects the earlier contribution of Kessler and McKenna (1978) and 
in particular their experiments regarding how adults make gender attribution 
judgements. They note that once an initial attribution is made, all subsequent judgments 
of an individual’s gender are made in the light of this initial attribution. This insight 
supports Halberstam’s emphasis on the response of spectators in gender attribution, 
reflecting also Butler’s (1990, 1993,2004)  focus on performance. Nevertheless, Carrie 
(Paechter, 2006a) has argued that this focus on gender attribution leaves little or no 
space for an individual’s understanding of their own identity, for their ability to define 
their own gender by answering the question ‘am I a man or a woman or something else 
entirely?’ (Whittle, 2000: 7): 7. She suggests that while gender can indeed be seen as 
performative, the question of to whom this performance is aimed needs to be 
understood in as broad a way as possible, so that the performance of the gendered self 
not just to others, but to oneself, and the consequent self-recognition is seen as a central 
part of the claiming and consequent attribution of gender. While others do clearly have 
a role to play in establishing gender attribution, it is also important to recognise that if 
individuals are to have ‘liveable lives’ (Butler, 2004:8) they must be enabled to 
determine their gender and have it recognised, for example, through the use of 
appropriate pronouns. In this sense, gender attribution, and the legitimation of people 
in their preferred gender, are matters of respect as much as anything else. 
 
In making these arguments, Carrie foregrounds notions of power and in particular 
considers these in relation to legitimacy and agency in gender ascription. While, she 
argues, legitimation is at least partly in the eye of the spectator, this raises problems for 
practical reasons to do with the configuration of actual bodies, coupled with Kessler and 
McKenna’s (1978) gender schema, which suggests that, in the West at least, we attribute 
as male in the absence of significant clues to the contrary. In particular, she is concerned 
to preserve the liveability of those lives which do not fit hegemonic gendered forms of 
embodiment (Butler, 2004). She notes, for example, that the taking of testosterone for a 
relatively short period gives an antomically female body key signifiers of maleness, such 
as facial hair, a deeper voice and even male pattern baldness: such changes cannot so 
easily be made to anatomically male bodies. This means that if gender attribution is 
purely a matter for the observer, it will be enacted in a differential way between, for 
example, transmen and transwomen, with the former more likely to have their gender 
claims legitimated and accepted than the latter. In practice, this may indeed be the case. 
While the idea that gender is mutually constructed between individual and observer 
does partially deal with this problem, there still remains some level of discrimination 
with regard to legitimation and legitimacy. Carrie is concerned to develop theoretical 
principles that can facilitate individual agency and provide the discursive possibilities 
that improve intelligibility and livability (Butler 2004). 
 
 
In this sense, Carrie’s concerns and theoretical reflections on gender categorization and 
identification address philosophical questions of agency and what ought to be. This is 
distinct from Becky’s primary preoccupation with issues of conceptual clarity, and for 
conceptual accounts that most accurately reflect the gendered social world. In her own 
explorations of gender construction and attribution, Becky has applied Bahktin’s 
understandings of language to analyse the power of the monoglossic account of gender. 
Bahktin (1980) conceives monoglossic accounts  as positing a totalising worldview 
which centralise particular socio-political readings and cultural expressions, in an 
attempt to purify and eradicate alternatives, and to achieve complete hegemony for the 
monoglossic account. Becky (Francis, 2010; 2012) applies the concepts of monoglossia 
and heteroglossia to gender, arguing that gendered behaviours, and the construct of 
gender itself, can be conceived as reflecting both monoglossia and heteroglossia. What is 
important about the monoglossic account of gender is its signifying power in spite of 
evident heteroglossia. Gender monoglossia appears to be able to present itself 
holistically, masking contradiction and dissonance even where these are evident. In her 
empirical work, for example, Becky notes how high achieving, popular high school 
students’ performances of gender were shot through with heteroglossic contradiction, 
and indeed with aspects of performance usually ascribed to the opposite ‘sex’; but that 
these students appeared to draw on particularly significant tropes of gendered 
performance to promote an overall impression of monoglossic gender stability, and 
mask/distract from inconsistency. These tropes were, for girls, an overt interest in 
stereotypically feminine pursuits such as fashion, celebrity, aesthetics, and 
heterosexuality (including the expression of ‘precocious feminininty’); and for boys, 
heterosexuality and ability at sport (see Francis et al 2010).  
 
The danger is that this monoglossic masking of gender heteroglossia is not identified by 
research, and that instead monoglossic, dualistic performances of masculinity and 
femininity are simply recorded (and thus re-inscribed) by research. Becky has  worked 
to show the heteroglossic diversity at work in all performances of gender, asserting the 
import of these empirical analyses for deconstructing the mythic (monoglossic) binary 
account of sex/gender (Francis, 2010; 2012). Thus in relation to our second point 
concerning reification of particular productions of masculinity and femininity, Becky’s 
work seeks to highlight both the ways in which subjects articulate and perpetuate 
gender monoglossia (and the power differentials produced by and producing the 
monoglossic account), while simultaneously highlighting the prevalent heteroglossic 
diversity that potentially disrupts and deconstructs gender monoglossia.  
 
This approach also gives us a way to address the afore-mentioned question of 
legitimacy and gender attribution. Beyond being attuned to the fundamental role of the 
spectator in shaping constructions of gender, we also need to attend to the multifarious 
gender discourses that underpin the individual gender performance and its reading. 
Application of Bahktin’s work insists on the mutual construction of gender viability – if 
spectators reject a gender production as illegitimate this reading inevitably impacts on 
the producers’ authenticity and subjectivity (Francis, 2012). Hence the power of the 
‘reader’ to assign gender is, for Becky, an integral aspect of ‘authentic’ identification 
(Kessler and McKenna, 1978). 
 
 
Like Becky, Carrie has also been concerned to unpick what is understood and implied by 
discourses of masculinity and femininity, and to uncover how power relations operate 
in this regard. For example, she has been concerned to analyse and clarify Connell’s 
(Connell, 1987, 1995, 2002; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005) work on hegemonic 
masculinity and, to some extent, ‘rescue’ it from several decades of misinterpretation. 
She has focused on reasserting the localised nature of hegemonic masculinity and 
pointing out that many of the problems associated with the concept arise from a 
reification of particular forms of masculinity as hegemonic. In particular, she has argued 
that, while stereotypical masculinities remain dominant in many circumstances, this is 
not always the case, and, indeed, they may be subordinate in some contexts. Both Carrie 
and Becky have also been at pains to disentangle the relationship between productions 
of masculinity, femininity, other facets of identity, and power. Carrie has explored the 
construction of hegemonic and other productions of masculinity, critiquing Connell’s 
view that all non-hegemonic masculinities are necessarily subordinate (Paechter, 2012) 
and Becky has questioned the extent to which these productions are actually ‘masculine’ 
(Francis, 2002, 2008). We argue that a range of productions of masculinity and 
femininity can be present in any particular context (indeed, we both maintain this to be 
the case within individual subjectivities, Francis, 2010, 2012; Paechter 2007), and that 
these are connected by complex and mobile relationships of power and resistance. 
Carrie has also worked on the relationship of ‘hegemonic masculinities’ to productions 
of femininity, arguing, following Connell (1987, 1995, 2002 ), that neither girls 
performing the locally hegemonic masculinity nor girls performing a locally emphasised 
femininity can be seen as hegemonic. This is because hegemonic masculinity is 
fundamentally defined as the form which, in that local context, justifies male dominance. 
Girls embodying and performing these forms of masculinity are not hegemonic in this 
sense, but transgressive (see Paechter, 2007, for discussion).  
 
This shared concern for philosophical and conceptual precision with regard to issues of 
gender attribution stems from our mutual aspiration to optimize out conceptual tools 
via which to effectively challenge gender inequality, and ultimately to further the 




So, in reflecting on the evolutions, circulations and lines of flight in gender theory as 
developed and applied in the education field, it is clear not only that have we come far, 
but also that much remains to be done. Despite the myriad issues and philosophical 
conundrums briefly signalled above, it tends to be the case that we continue to attribute 
gender as if it were the same as (dualistic) sex, and to analyse performance in relation 
to (binarised) constructions of masculinity and femininity. This status quo is perhaps 
not surprising given the particular empirical context of gender and education research: 
education institutions, wherein dualistic productions of gender remain determinedly 
and overtly inscribed. We work in classrooms where registers are organized into lists of 
‘the girls’ and ‘the boys’; where boys and girls are frequently made to sit alternately, to 
line up separately, and/or to compete, in production of school disciplinary practices; 
where lavatories are segregated, uniforms are gender distinct, and girls and boys are 
separated for certain subjects (or even for schooling). Attempts to disrupt or ‘do 
differently’ in these contexts can seem facile. Nevertheless, our complicity in these 
practices in naming and analyzing according to gender [sex] further interpolates and re-
inscribes the binary and associated monoglossic practices. 
 
These problems are exacerbated by the tendency in gender and education research to 
identify gendered patterns that reflect the status quo, rather than analyzing elements of 
performance that trouble monoglossic productions of gender (Francis, 2010). The 
difficulty, here and above, is that power is unevenly mobilised according to gender, and 
that patterns of behaviour, social discourse, and discrimination, do manifest in 
continuing gender inequality. As many authors have pointed out, gender remains the 
pivotal unit of analysis in feminist work. If we do not identify and analyse research 
participants according to gender, the feminist project is rendered inoperable. 
 
This brings us back to the issue of categorization of gender, which has provoked much 
commentary from us both, and which constitutes a central conundrum we wish to 
highlight in this article. During the half-century since early pioneers such as Stoller 
(1968) and Kessler & McKenna (1978) rejected the determinist binary model of sex, the 
social construction of the sex dualism (Fausto-Sterling, 1987; Butler, 1990) has become 
increasingly socially evident. Indeed, in recent years the greater accessibility of 
hormone treatments and surgery, alongside the growing visibility of groups such as 
Intersexiii (facilitated by the internet and social media), has meant that the fallacy of the 
sex dualism is increasingly difficult to uphold. This is not in any way to suggest that 
subjects that do not ‘fit’ the monoglossic, binary construction of gender/sex are no 
longer problematised and/or impossibilised. However, the more they are represented, 
the harder it is to deny their existence.  
 
Yet, as we have seen, the deconstruction of the gender binary comprises not only a 
challenge to the monoglossic gender order, but also to feminist theory. We arrive at two 
fundamental tensions, which are necessary to confront in order assess productive ways 
forward. The first is between agency and/or determinism in legitimation of gender: 
gender as a point of claimed (agentic) identification against the more deterministic 
recognition that gender identification has to be recognized and legitimated in order to 
‘pass’ as ‘authentic’, and is produced by a collage of different discursive and material 
elements within a specific context. The second tension is whether we should aim to 
deconstruct gender entirely, or not. The answer to this second question precipitates 
further practical dilemmas concerning the recognition, in the present, that gender 
identity involves inequalities of power and outcome which need to be captured and 
documented. As Connell (2010) points out, this is particularly important for those in the 
global South, for whom, for example, struggles against gendered violence (Bhana, 
2005a, b) require, at least at present, the retention of normative gender categories, in 
order to be able to support and implement policies for practical action. If we are serious 
about fighting entrenched sexism wherever it is found, we need to be able to recognise 
it, and this requires us to be able to recognise and record differences in the treatment of 
men and women, boys and girls. Similarly, if we are unable to recognise a relationship 
as being same-sex, it becomes impossible to campaign for such relationships to be 
universally recognised. At the same time, the very act of categorization required for 
such documentation reproduces precisely those gender binaries which we may, 
perhaps, wish to deconstruct. 
 
These dilemmas evidently cannot be resolved within a single article. Nevertheless, we 
offer here some analysis to stimulate further discussion on these highly significant 
conceptual challenges. Both tensions are of course inter-related. The first tension, 
between gender as a point of claimed identification, and gender as something that has to 
be recognized and legitimated, speaks both to theories of identification, the validity or 
otherwise of gender claims, and to practical and ethical matters of categorization during 
research. As we have argued above, as a socially constructed category, gender is 
necessarily mutually constructed, and gender identification/recognition relies both on 
the subject and spectators, and the multi-facted bricolage of material (including 
embodied) and discursive elements present and implicated in the construction of the 
interaction. The latter bricolage, ‘network’ or ‘assemblage’ is increasingly being taken 
seriously via application of Bakhtian, Actor Network Theory, Communities of Practice 
(Paechter, 2003a,2003d, 2006c, 2007) and/or Deleuzian lenses. Indeed, referring to the 
latter perspective, Fox and Alldred (2013) maintain that it 
 
“…establishes a fundamental difference of focus between anthropocentric and anti-
humanist ontologies: between exploring the social interactions of active, sense-
making human agents and mapping impersonal affective flows and territorialisations 
within assemblages.” (p. 774) 
 
All four theoretical lenses enable this important philosophical move in dissolving the 
binary between individual-agency and society-context-determinism, in addition to 
addressing the limitations of a purely discursive analysis by accounting for the impact of 
materiality/embodiment on constructions (see Francis, 2012). We personally find 
Bakhtinian analyses (Becky) and approaches involving communities of practice (Carrie) 
as more convincing and empirically productive accounts for analytical application in 
social researchiv. However, in terms of our role as researchers, the question remains as 
to a) how we are categorizing gender in our fieldwork and analyses; and b) the 
implications of this, in simultaneously interpolating and perpetuating gender even as 
we critique its effects. With regard to the former, we have already discussed the 
dilemma of categorizing gender by the body/by a self-claim/by performance (gendered 
attributes), and this clearly remains an area for further conceptual debate and empirical 
trial. With regard to the latter, this question returns us to the well-rehearsed, circular 
predicament which some have attempted to circumnavigate via the adoption of a 
‘strategic essentialist’ approach (DePalma, 2009: 6). This approach recognizes the 
temporary necessity of identity labels, in order to identify power inequalities, and to 
potentially challenge and deconstruct them. However, it still falls prey to the critique 
that the continued focus on gender identity categories and ‘differences’ reifies and 
perpetuates the gender binary. 
 
With regard to the second tension: whether we should aim to deconstruct gender 
entirely, or not, we can only speculate at present. Any attempt at resolution, and 
committed work towards this end, would require a significant leap of the imagination in 
order to gain any understanding of what it might be like to live in a genderless future. 
We two feel slightly differently about this as a utopia, but have found the issue fruitful to 
debate together. At present, investments in gender (binary or otherwise) are so strongly 
visceral that to move away from the idea that everyone has some form of gender 
identity (including identities such as Intersex, Gender queer and/or Androgynous) is 
difficult to imagine. Many newly recognized gender identities (notably trans) have been 
hard fought for, and often invest in gender distinction rather than gender 
deconstruction. As Butler (and Williams, 2014) argues: 
 
Sometimes there are ways to minimize the importance of gender in life, or to 
confuse gender categories so that they no longer have descriptive power. But 
other times gender can be very important to us, and some people really love 
the gender that they have claimed for themselves. If gender is eradicated, so 
too is an important domain of pleasure for many people. And others have a 
strong sense of self bound up with their genders, so to get rid of gender 
would be to shatter their self-hood. I think we have to accept a wide variety 
of positions on gender. Some want to be gender-free, but others want to be 
free really to be a gender that is crucial to who they are. 
 
Even those who see themselves as non-binary may not necessarily prefer to live in a 
world in which gender had become a meaningless concept (albeit there are many of us 
that do see this deconstruction of gender as a utopian prospect). In considering these 
issues, therefore, it behoves us to be mindful that our response to the increasing 
visibility and political power of currently marginalised individuals and groups does not 
lead to a denial of identifications for which they have fought long and hard. We also 
need, as suggested above, to ensure that a deconstruction of gender led by the 
metropolitan global North does not inadvertently make it harder to identify and unpick 
power relations based around normative gender forms in the wider global arena 
(Connell, 2010). 
 
Because gender binaries are currently so strongly embedded in our psychic 
identifications, whether these are along, across, or straddling binary lines, it is currently 
almost unthinkable for most of us that we could de-invest in these identities and move 
to a gender-free world. However, it is possible that over generations of gradual 
diversification (the intensification of heteroglossia; changes in power relations within 
communities of gendered practice) such investments might be displaced. Indeed, the 
speed of changes in the legal and social recognition of minoritised gender and sexual 
identities in some parts of the world – unthinkable just a generation ago- might point to 
feasibility here. What is unclear, however, is what this might mean for individuals and 
their identifications. It might be argued that, rather than trying to eliminate gender, we 
should instead aim for the end of discrimination between gendered 
identities/positionings, with a strongly heteroglossic understanding of the range of 
possibilities these might encompass. However, this approach risks overlooking the way 
that social practices mobilise distinctions to perpetuate hierarchies and inequalities of 
power (often but not always tied to essentialised constructs such as ‘race’ or sex), which 
continue to marginalize and oppress particular groups. At the same time, history shows 
us how identifications, points of recognition and the reified objects that accompany 
these (including bodies and how they are understood) change in social and personal 
importance alongside other historical changes. So even though the aim of immediate 
elimination of gender is potentially ethically fraught as well as practically implausible, 
that does not necessarily imply that it is not a viable aim for the longer-term future. 
 
This brings us to the question of ‘what we do now’, and productive ways that enable us 
to move between the present place of needing our (workable and accurate) gender 
categories, to the point at which gender becomes deconstructed. Analysis of gender 
monoglossia and gender heteroglossia facilitates attention to continuing power 
inequalities and analyzable discursive and material practices which work to reproduce 
and naturalise gender, but simultaneously enables attention to the heteroglossic 
contradiction and turbulence which is increasingly troubling gender monoglossia. (For 
full discussion of this theoretical application, see Francis 2012; and for empirical 
application, see Francis 2010). And in order to effect this analysis, without falling into 
some of the problematics of categorization identified above, we suggest that we need to 
mobilise analyses and modes of categorization that simultaneously reflect three 
different lenses. These are:  
 
1) the spectator view. In other words, the perception of researchers as observers in 
the field, of parents, other students/peers, and of institutions, that our respondents 
are (for example), girls, boys, women, men, other, or uncategorisable.  
2) the individual respondents’ view. This means actualizing within our research tools 
the facility for respondents to categorise themselves as they wish (e.g. providing 
respondents with the option of female/male/other –twith the option to specify what 
that other is - as is now common in Germanyv). 
3) the features of the local discursive and material collage which enables the gender 
production and recognition. In other words, describing and analyzing the ways in 
which gender production is informed by bodies, aesthetic adornment/decoration, 
gendered expressions of behaviour/attributes, material objects and cultural 
discourses within the local context, and so on, all of which enable, constrain, 
construct, and deconstruct intelligible productions of gender.  
 
All of this needs to be openly declared and evidenced so that other researchers may 
contest and deconstruct the resulting analyses; but the very act of making this complex 
analysis transparent functions to problematise, rather than to reify and naturalise, both 
the gender binary and the concept of gender. 
 
If we did take this approach, combining three different lenses of categorization, how 
would it affect children – so frequently the subjects of our research? Children are in an 
interesting position in that in some ways it is harder for them to use their bodies to 
make gender identity claims, but in other ways it is easier. It is harder because they are 
not subject, in the ways that adults are, to Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) gender 
schema: most of the ways in which maleness becomes an automatic attribution in the 
absence of other clues are not available to them because of their lack of physical 
maturity. This means that, in situations of gender-neutral dress, hairstyle, etc., we may 
have to pay closer attention to the detail of children’s gender identity claims and 
performances in order to give due respect and legitimation to individuals’ 
understandings of who they are. This adds further complexity to the spectator view 
element of our gender categorization, if only because spectators themselves, mindful of 
these ambiguities, tend to be more provisional in their initial attributions when it comes 
to children, particularly girls, for whom (through the tomboy label) self-presentation in 
ways stereotypically associated with boys is a socially acceptable and not uncommon 
phenomenon.  On the other hand, children struggling against potential attributions 
which go against their felt identities can, at least while clothed, make convincing 
performances more easily than many others. Their performances are not undermined, 
as those of adults may be, by breasts, deep voices, Adam’s apples, male pattern baldness 
or beard growth. This allows some children to experiment and play with gender in ways 
that are not always available to others – though again this experimentation is more 
available to girls, through the adoption of tomboy identities and self-presentations, than 
it is to boys. Conversely, we know from the research literature that sometimes gender 
binaries can be exacerbated for children, with gender category maintenance work 
(Davies, 1989) causing especially inflexible boundaries and policing. This is particularly 
the case for very young children, for whom concepts of gender constancy are not well 
understood. Adult constructions, such as ‘the Metrosexual’, and so on, which embrace 
heteroglossia, are also less available to children, leaving boys in particular with fewer 
non-conformist options. Finally, in regard to the local collage which shapes gender 
production, it may be important to be attuned to the relative lack of agency for children 
in this regard (for example given their mandatory attendance at school, and their 
exclusion from certain sites and activities on the basis of age). 
 
Concluding remarks 
In summary, we have reviewed developments in the field of gender and education, 
charting conceptual developments and continuing conundrums, and highlighting the 
problem of classification as a key dilemma continuing to ‘haunt’ gender and education. 
Identifying two key tensions underpinning this empirical dilemma – the tension 
between agency and determinism in gender identification, and that between gender 
deconstruction and gender analysis – we have sought to weave a path through some of 
the multifarious and complex debates relating to these. Articulating some of the ways 
we have approached these theoretical challenges in our recent work, we returned to the 
issue of gender categorisation in relation to empirical analyses in education. We argued 
that in order to avoid essentialism and the reification of gender distinction, we need to 
apply three different elements in our categorisation and analysis of gender: spectator 
perspective; respondent perspective; and social context. This is not without its 
challenges, and may require new methodological techniques to actualise. Nevertheless, 
we posit that this ‘three-fold’ approach to gender categorisation will better enable us to 
simultaneously ‘hold’ the elements contributing to (heteroglossic and mercurial) gender 
productions, without compromising their complexity. This in turn supports the 
justification of our continued analysis of gender, and its (for the moment) resilient role 
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i There are exceptions, including the notable attempt by Fox and Alldred (2013) to apply Deleuzian theory 
to the construction of sexuality (relevant to, and by implication applicable to, the related construction of 
gender). 
ii See, for example, Davies, 2003; Evans, Rich, Davies, & Allwood, 2008; Gallas, 1998; Gard, 2001; Gordon & 
Lahelma, 1996; Imperato-McGinley et al., 1979; Kehily, 2001; Kelly, Pomerantz, & Currie, 2005; Nanda, 
1999; Prendergast, 2000; Blaise, 2005; Clark, 2010; Martin, 2011; Nespor, 1997; Paechter, 2003b, 2003c, 
2003d, 2006b, 2007; Renold, 2005; Rich & Evans, 2009) 
iii We recognise that those people with ‘intersex’ bodies include a range of identifications, sometimes 
including binarised gender identities, while others actively identity as Intersex. 
iv The lack of empiricism in Deleuzian accounts often limits analysis of assemblages/machines to 
speculation; bereft of methods to assess which elements of an assemblage have enabled or constrained 
outcomes (or indeed what these multifarious ‘molecular’ elements might be). 
v See BBC, 2013, reporting that Germany has creted a new category of ‘indeterminate’ (or leaving gender 
category items blank) on children’s birth certificates to cater for Intersex. This in turn has proved 
contentious; see for example coverage by OLL Australia, https://oii.org.au/23183/germany-third-gender-
birth-certificates/ 
 
